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The Effect of the Investment Tax Credit on the Value of  the Firm 
ABSTRACT 
A  change in the tax law that increaaes investment incentives foc new assets 
may result in  excess returns on  new investment,  causing firm value to increaae. 
Alternatively, because the investment incentives apply only to  new inveatmenta, 
the value of existing assets that compete with these investments may decline.  A 
model is developed in this paper which shows that in general investment 
incentives have  a theoretically ambiguous effect on  firm value.  Modela proposed 
by Abel (1982),  Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983),  and Feldmtein (1981) are shown to 
be special cases of  this more general  model.  Empirical teata examine the changes 
in  firm value to repeated changes of the investment tax credit.  Cross-sectional 
teats find the changes in  firm value are positively reiated to the expected 
receipt of  investment tax credita.  No  evidence is fnund to aupport a 
relationship between expected changes in the value of a firm's existing aaaets 
and changes in  firm value. 
Andrew B. Lyon 
Bureau of Business and 
Economic Reaearch and 
Department of  Economica 
University of  Maryland 
College Park,  Maryland 20742 
(3Dl) 454-2303 The Tax Reform  Act of 1986 repealed  the investment  tax credit  (ITC),  iuirking 
the third  time the ITC has either  been suspended  or repealed  since  its 
introduction  in 1962.  The ITC was originally  designed  to  encourage  new 
investment  by reducing  the after-tax  cost  of new investment  at  a smaller  cost  to 
the government  than from  a statutory  tax rate  reduction.  A  ITC only  reduces  the 
tax burden  of new investment,  while a statutory  rate reduction  also  reduces  tax 
revenues  from  existing  investment.  To prevent  existing  assets  from  being  resold 
to qualify  for the ITC,  the amount  of used investment  eligible  for the ITC always 
was strictly  limited. 
The selective  lowering  of the effective  tax rate  faced by new investment 
through  the ITC is traditionally  thought  to increase  the after-tax  return  from 
new investment,  without  altering  the profitability  of existing  assets.  Under 
this assumption,  the value of  the firm must increase  following  the introduction 
of an  ITC.  Abel (1982) presents  a partial  equilibrium  model that  supports  this 
view which  will  be referred  to as the "traditional  hypothesis." 
The traditional  hypothesis  has been  challenged  by Auerbach  and Kotlikoff 
(1983)  and Feldstein  (1981).  The Auerbach-Kotlikoff-Feldstein  (A-K-F)  hypothesis 
maintains  that the value  of a firm  must decline  following  the introduction  of an 
ITC.  They  argue that if competition  eliminates  any excess  return  to new 
investment,  then  the value  of existing  assets must decline  by the amount  of the 
ITC in  order  to compete  in the output  market  with the subsidized  new investment. 
Following  this view,  Downs  and Hendershott  (1987) derive  the theoretical 
increases  in  the value  of firms  from the 1986  Tax Reform  Act. 
Summers  (1981,  1983), Gravelle (1984), and, more recently,  Auerbach (1986) 
note the ambiguous  effects  of an ITC on firm  value.  The long-run  equilibrium 
value of existing  capital  is expected  to  decline  by the amount  of  the  ITC.  Until 
the long-run  equilibrium  is reached,  however,  new investment  may earn an excess -2- 
return.  Whether the value of  the firm increases or  decreases upon  the 
implementation of  the ITC depends on  the magnitude of  these excess returns. 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff warn  that the ITC and similar accelerated 
depreciation provisions may cause "significant inframarginal redistribution from 
current holders of  wealth to those with  small or  zero claims on  the existing 
stock of  capital."  The actual direction and magnitude of  the wealth 
redistribution caused by these investment incentives and other tax policies is an 
important issue in  the design of tax reform.  As suggested by  Feldstein (1976) 
policymakers may seek to minimize any  windfall gains and losses that accompany 
tax reform.  Knowledge of  the magnitude of  the wealth  transfers is essential in 
comparing alternative proposals and in  weighing these redistributions against the 
efficiency gains of  each proposal.  In  addition to  equity considerations, wealth 
redistribution can  have  important real effects on  the economy through changes in 
saving, consumption, and bequests.  These wealth  effects can either reinforce or 
offset the direct incentive effects of a tax policy on  saving or  consumption. 
The many  past legislative changes to  the ITC provide an excellent "natural 
experiment" to  examine the actual effect of  the ITC on  the value of  the firm. 
For publicly traded firms, changes in  the value of a firm may be  observed by 
changes in  the value of the firm's common stock.  Data  on  the value of a firm's 
assets and the amount of  investment in  assets eligible for the TTC may  be used to 
construct estimates of  the change in  the value of  the firm  predicted by the 
traditional hypothesis and  the A-K-F hypothesis.  If the traditional hypothesis 
is correct, firms that are expected to invest in  a significant amount of 
equipment eligible for the ITC should increase in  value relative to other firms 
when  an  ITC is implemented.  If  the A-K-F hypothesis is correct, firms that -3- 
intensively own  assets that would be  eligible for the ITC if purchased new should 
decline in value relative to other firms when an  ITC is implemented. 
The structure of  this paper is as follows.  Section I develops a model to 
present the possible theoretical effects of  changes in  ITCs on  the value of  the 
firm.  Section II presents the empirical procedures for testing the traditional 
hypothesis and the A-K-F hypothesis.  Section In  presents the empirical results. 
The empirical estimates provide substantial support for the traditional 
hypothesis and tend to reject the A-K-F hypothesis.  The final section provides 
conclusions  to the analysis. 
I.  The Theoretical Effects of  Investment Incentives en  the Value 
of the Firm 
The value of a firm consisrs of  both  the value of  the firm's existing assets 
and the excess return, if  any, the firm can earn on  its future investment. 
Investment incentives may  affect these two components of firm  value in oppoaite 
directions.  An ITC may increase the return from new investment,  while it  reduces 
the value of  a firm's existing assets.  In  general, the effect of  investment 
incentives on  the value of the firm  is ambiguous. 
One condition under which inframsrginal new investment msy  earn an  excess 
return is  if there are costs of  adusting to  a new level of tspitalj  These 
adjustment costs may  include costs of  installing the new investment, interference 
with  current production, and managerial effort.  If  adjustment costs are a convex 
function of  investment, inframerginal investment is able to earn an  excess 
return. 
The following model of  the vslum of a firm can  help illustrate the effects 
of  Sn ITC on  firm value.  Consider a firm  i with  s production function F(Kt), 
1  See Eisner and Strotz (1963), Lucas (1967), Could (1968),  Treadway (1969) 
and  btusss  (1917). -4- 
where Kft is the firm's stock of  capital at time t,  F'>O, and F<O.  Let the 
total cost to the firm, before taxes, of  investing 'it be It  + c(Tit), where c 
is the adjustment cost function with c'>O and c">O.  Assume the following 
parameters: the initial price of the firm's output is p0, the constant after-tax 
discount rate is r,2 the firm's tax rate is u,3 the initial rate of  the ITC is 
the present value of  depreciation allowances per dollar of  investment is Z, 
and the present value of  remaining depreciation allowances on  all existing 
capital at  time s is  It  is assumed that adjustment costs reduce current 
profits so  that the after-tax adjustment cost is (l-u)c(It).  The value of the 
firm  at  time a may then be  written as 
+  uB.  (I) 
Let us  assume that initially the economy is in  equilibrium with  k0O  and at 
time a the rate of  the ITC is increased to k>O.  If  the output  price  remains 
constant (as in  Abel (1982)), then the ITC can only increase firm  value.  The 
firm could maintain the same time path  of  investment as it would in  the absence 
of an  ITC, yet at a lower cost.  If the firm increased investment, its profits 
would be even  greater. 
If the output price is not constant, the conclusion that the introduction of 
2  The supply of  funds to  firms is assumed to be infinitely elastic so that 
the after-tax discount rate is unaffected by  the level of  investment.  As 
discussed in footnote 4 this assumption may  be  relaxed in  showing that firm value 
may not always increase when  an  ITC is introduced. 
The model abstracts from personal taxes.  In  the presence of  personal 
taxes firm value might be  affected differently depending on whether the change  in 
cash-flow is expected to affect dividends or retained earnings. -5- 
an  ITG unambiguously increases firm value no longer  holds.4  First, consider the 
case with no  adjustment costs where an  ITC at  rate k1 induces new firms to  enter 
and reduces output price to p1.  With  no  adjustment costs, an  entrant j would 




where & is the exponential rate of  depreciation,  Equation (2)  states that  firm j 
invests until the marginal profit from an  additional unit of  capital for firm j 
equals  the net cost of  investment. 
With  the inclusion of  adjustment costs the result is similar.  If each firm 
views itself as too small to affect output price but takes the new output price 
into consideration in formulating its investment decisions, firms will  undertake 
any investment opportunities for which  the present value of  the after-tax returns 
from an  additional unit  of  capital exceed the after-tax cost of investment.  The 
solution to Equation (1)  for the optimal level of investment is then 
l-k-uZ + (l-u)c' — 
p((lu)pF(Kit))e(14fl(t5)dt. 
(3) 
The firm invests until the profits from a  marginal investment equal the  net cost 
of  investment plus the marginal cost  of adjustment. 
Because each unit of  capital earns the return given by  Equation (3),  the 
total returns from  the investment of  the quantity 'is are 
I.  [1-k -uZJ ÷ I.  (l-u)c'.  (4)  15  1  iS 
The net  profit from  the investment  is positive since the convexity of the 
adjustment cost function implies (lu)[Ic' 
- c(I)J >  0.  This is the excess 
return earned from new investment in  period a. 
Alternatively, the assumption of a fixed output price may he maintained 
and firm value may still decline if (1)  the after-tax rate of  return is not 
constant (r1>r3) or (2)  in the more general case with  labor in  the production 
function, the supply of  labor is fixed in  the economy but mobile among firms. The total excess return to future investment is given by 
(1-u)  f((I.)c' 
-  c(I.t)}e(t5)dt. 
(5) 
If there were  no  decline in  the return to existing capital, this is the amount by 
which the value of  the firm would increase. 
While inframarginal new  investment earns an  excess return, the increase in 
the ITC causes an  increase in  investment and output; as a result, output price 
declines causing the profit from a unit  of  existing capital to decline.  Assuming 
the economy was in  equilibrium with  no  ITC initially, the decline in  value of  a 
unit of  existing capital is (from Equation (3)) 
fl-uZ] 
-  [l-k-uZ+(l-u)c'}  — k  - (l-u)c'.  (6) 
The total change in the value of  the firm is ambiguous, depending on the 
magnitude of  the excess return to new investment, shown in  Equation (5), relative 
to the decline in  the value of  the existing capital stock. 
One special case  where the value of  the firm must increase following the 
implementation of an  ITC is under the condition of an  infinite marginal cost  of 
adjustment for expansion of  the capital stock, but no adjustment coat  for 
investment less than or equal to depreciation.  Assuming that in  the absence of 
an  ITO (k5—O)  each  firm would have  chosen investment equal to its depreciated 
capital in  each  period, then from Equation (1) the implementation of an  ITO at 




where E is the depreciation rate of  capital.  Because output does not change in 
this particular case, there is no  decline in  the value of  existing capital and 
the result  found by  Abel that the value of  the firm  must increase also is found 
here. -7- 
As  suggested earlier, a special case supporting the A-K-F hypothesis  that 
the value of  the firm must  decrease following the implementation of an  ITC is 
where there are no  costs of  adjustment.  Solving Equation (1)  for the optimal 
level of  investment for an  ITC at  rate k1 under the assumption of no  adjustment 
costs yields 
l-k-uZ — j((l.u)pF(K.tfle((t5)dt. 
(8) 
The marginal  return to each unit  of  existing capital declines by  k1, and because 
there is no  excess return to  new investment, the value of the firm declines by 
.5 
This  discussion has shown the theoretical ambiguity of  the effects of 
changes in  investment incentives for new assets on  firm valuation.  If adjustment 
costs are small and the economy quickly teaches its new equilibrium level of 
capital stock, the A-K-F hypothesis of a decline in the value of the firm  may be 
most appropriate.  If adjustment costs are large, then excess  profits on  new 
investment may be substantial and the traditional hypothesis may  most accurately 
describe changes in firm value.  If adjustment costs differ across firms and 
industries, no  single theory may adequately describe the economy-wide effects of 
investment incentives on  firm valuation.  The following sections of this paper 
develop an  empirical test of  the two hypotheses to determine their actual  ability 
to account for changes in  firm valuation  following changes in  the ITC. 
The value of a  unit  of  capital would decline by  less thank1 if the 
supply curve for new capital goods were not perfectly elastic.  Provided that all 
new capital goods are sold  at the same price in  any period and that the supply 
curve is not perfectly inelastic, the A-K-F hypothesis still predicts that the 
value of  the firm will  decline. -g- 
II.  Empirical Procedures 
The analysis in  this section provides an  empirical framework for modeling 
and estiaating the change in  value of  the firm predicted by  the traditional and 
A-K-F hypotheses following changes to  the ITt.  First, measures representing the 
two hypotheses are formulated and, second, the relationship  between these 
measures and the estimated change in  value of  firms is analyzed. 
A.  Representing the Traditional  and A-K-F Hypotheses 
The ITt applied predominantly to purchases of  new equipment and public 
utility property.  During the period  examined in this paper, the rate of  the ITt 
ranged from a maximum of  seven percent for long-lived equipment to 2  1/3 percent 
for abort-lived equipment.6  Public utility property was eligible for only  3/7 of 
the applicable percentage until 1971. 
Under the traditional hypothesis,  the aaving provided by  the ITt for the 
purchase of an  asset results in higher profits for the firm.  Let k  be the 
applicable rate of  the iTt for aaaet  7, where j—l  J.  Let  be the gross 
expenditure (gross of  depreciation and gross of  the ITO) by  firm i on  asset j  in 
a given year.  If  the traditional hypothesis is correct, the benefit to the firm 
in  that year  is equal to the total amount of  ITCa received by the firm7 
k 
Jj-i  j'ij  (9) 
The increase in  the value of the firm at the time of  the announcement of the tax 
change is the present value of  these future  benefits.  Under the assumption  that 
6  The  maximum rate of  the ITt was increased to  lD percent in  1975. 
This  assumes the firm  has sufficient tax liability against which  the ITt 
may  be  applied.  Altshuler and Auerbach (1987)  estimate that between 1976-1980 
approximately 25 percent of  all firms may  have been  constrained in  their use of 
ITCs due to  present and past losses and limits on the percentage of  tax liability 
that may be  offset with ITCs. -9- 
the return to  new investment is increased by  the entire amount of the ITC, the 
percentage change in  firm value is 
(10) 
where V is the current value of  the firm, g is the expected real growth rate of 
the firm, and r is the real after-tax discount rate.  This is a  more  general 
expression of  the change in the value of  the firm given in  Equation (7),  which 
was derived under the assumption of an  infinite cost of  adjustment for investment 
in excess of  depreciation. 
If  the adjustment cost  is not infinite, the entry of  further investment 
would be expected to  limit the extent to which the benefit of  the ITC persists 
into the future.  In  this study, it is assumed that all firma have the same 
discount rate and  expected growth rate.  The percentage change in  firm value 
predicted  by the traditional hypothesis is assumed to be  a function of 
kI 
(11) 
Under the A-K-F hypothesis, the decline in  value of an existing asset is 
directly related to the rate of the ITC on  new assets against which it must 
compete.  If  there are no  adjustment costs, the percentage decline in  the value 
of  the firm is given by 
1kjK1i.  (12) 
If there are adjustment coats, existing assets will  not decline in  value by the 
full amount of  the ITC.  It is assumed that the percentage decline in firm  value 
predicted by  the A-K-F hypothesis is a function of Equation (12). 
To estimate the values  of Equations (11)  and (12)  for a firm, data Jo- 
representing each of  the variables are required.8  A detailed data set on the 
capital atock of  25 types of  assets eligible fot the ITO,  other depreciable 
assets, and land present in  each  of  44  industry groups has been  constructed by 
Jorgenson.9  It  ia aasumed in this study chat the proportion of  capital stock 
held  among all depreciable assets is the same for all firms in  a given industry. 
It is also assumed that the proportion of  investment in each asset is equal to 
the proportion of  capital atock in  each asset)-°  Assets eligible for the ITO and 
the ITO rate for each aaaet in the period before 1971 are shown in  Table 1.11 
COMPUSTAT data  are used  to provide the total amount of  inveatment and 
capital of  each firm.  Two alternative measures are used to represent the 
expected investment of  the firm: (1)  current capital expenditurea and (2)  the 
book  value of  depreciation.  If the investment plana of the firm are unknown in 
advance to investors, depreciation may better represent expected inveatment than 
actual expenditures.  The  book  value of  the firm's net plant and equipment is 
Alternatively, the quantity of  ITCa actually received by  the firm may be 
used  in  the numerator of Equation (11).  During the period examined many firma 
did  not report the ITC and some fitms reported only an  amortized portion of  the 
ITO.  There may be  a sample selection bias in  using only firms that reported the 
full ITC in their income atatementa.  Ayrea  (1987)  examines 175 firma which 
reported full receipt of the ITC and finds the change in firm value to be 
positively related to reported ITCa. 
Using capital flow tables on  the amount of investment in each asset and 
applying economic rates of  depreciation to  past  investment, Jorgenson has 
estimated the net stock of  each of  these assets present in the 44 industry groupa 
for the year  1977.  The construction of  this data set is explained in more derail 
in Fraumeni and Jorgenson (1980) and  Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981).  The actual 
data  are unpublished. 
10  The U.S. Department of  Commerce (1980)  has published data on  groaa 
investment  in each asset for 76 industry groups in 1972.  Thia data  ser waa used 
in  preliminary teats and yielded very similar statistical results to those found 
for the Jorgenson data set. 
11  The applicable rate of  the ITC is baaed on  the 1962 Depreciation 
Guideline tax life for each asset.  These lives are derived for each of  the 25 
types of  assets by  Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981). -11- 
used  to represent the capital stock of  the firm.  Finally, the total value of  the 
firm is taken to be  the book  value of  total assets, which includes net plant and 
equipment, inventories, cash equivalents, and certain intangible assets. 
These variables are combined with  (1)  the industry-specific proportions of 
assets eligible for the ITC from the Jorgenson data set and (2)  the applicable 
rate of the ITC for each  asset to construct two alternative measures of Equation 
(11) and one measure of  Equation (12).  The two measures representing the 
traditional hypothesis in  Equation (11) are labelled CAPTA and DEPTA, where the 
measures are constructed using capital expenditures and  depreciation, 
respectively.  The measure representing the A-K-F hypothesis, based on  the net 
plant and equipment of  the firm, is  labelled NPTA.12 
B.  Estimating Chanees in Firm Value from  the Investment Tax Credit 
The ITC was first introduced in the Revenue Act of 1962 following lengthy 
legislative debate.  Between 1966 and 1971 the ITC was suspended twice and 
reinstated twice by  presidential request.  In 1986 the ITC was repealed as part 
of  the 1986 Tax Reform  Act, following the recommendation of a  November 1984 
Treasury Department study. 
Unlike the initial enactment and recent repeal of the ITC, the series of 
presidential requests between 1966 and 1971 initiated fast congressional action 
12  To  examine the accuracy of  the variables DEPTA and  CAPTA in identifying 
the quantity of  ITCs received by a firm in  a given year, a comparison was made 
between these calculated values and Internal Revenue Service data.  The variables 
DEPTA, CAPTA, and  NPTA  were constructed for fiscal year  1968 for 710,  685,  and 
711 firms, respectively. IRS data on  ITC5 received by  firms by  industry group and 
asset size within each industry group are taken from Statistics of  Income 1968. 
Corporate Tax Returns (1972), table 4, pp.  26-58. The 711 firms may be placed 
into 29  IRS industry classifications and correspond to 109 IRS industry-asset 
group classifications.  The IRS information was used  to  calculate the ratio of 
the ITC received by  a group to its total assets for each of  the 109 groups. The 
correlation between this IRS variable and the measures DEPTA, CAPTA, and  NPTA  are 
.44,  .36,  and .45,  respectively.  These measures do  appear to distinguish 
differences  in the level of  ITCs received by the different groups of firms. -12- 
leading to the reinstatement or  suspension of  the ITO.  Tn September 1966, 
Ptesident Johnson requested the immediate temporary suspension of ITO until 
January  1968.  The next change came in  March 1967 when  President Johnson asked 
for the immediate reinstatement of  the credit.  In  April 1969,  President Nixon 
requested the permanent repeal of the TTO.  The fourth change came in  August 1971 
when  President Nixon  asked for the reenactment of the ITO.  This series of  events 
provides sn  excellent opportunity  to exsmine the effect of  changes to the ITO on 
the value of the firm.'3 
To test whether firms were affected by  the presidential requests leading to 
the suspension or reinstatement of  the ITO,  firm stock prices are examined.  A 
version of the Ospitsi Asset Pricing Model is estimated, where it is assumed thst 
security returns for firm  i conform to the model 
R. -R  —$.(R  -R  )+6.  D  +6.  D  +6.  D  +6.  D  +c.  ,  (13)  it  sot  i  mt  sot  i,66  65  1,57 67  1,65  56  3,71  71  it 
where R—log(l+r), and  nt  is the return to  security i in  month t, rmt is the 
value-weighted return to the market  portfolio, snd r 
is the return on a 90-day 
Tressury bill.  Tt  is assumed thst the residual  is normally distributed with 
mean  zero.  The D's are dummy variables, with  esch subscript denoting the year of 
the presidential request.  The vslue of  each  dummy variable is one in  the month 
of a presidential request to  reinstate the ITO, negative one in  a  month  to 
suspend the ITO, and  zero otherwise.  For example, D  is equal to negative one 
in September 1966 and zero for all other months.  The estimated  coefficients 
measure the covariance of  the return of  security i with  the market return over 
all months.  The Sj coefficients measure the abnormsl return to security i in the 
month of  each presidential request.  A t-test on  an  estimated 6j coefficient 
13  These dates were selected prior to  any empiricsl tests.  No other dates 
were  tested. -13- 
provides a measure of  the significance of  the abnormal return for the month of 
the presidential request to  change the ITC.14 
If we  assume that each of  the four tax changes are of  equal importance, 
equally unanticipated, and the abnormal return to a security for the 
reinstatement of  the credit is opposite to the abnormal return for the suspension 
of  the credit, Equation  (13)  can be simplified.15  A measure of  the significance 
of  all the changes to the ITC can be estimated from the model 
R.  -R  — .(R  -R  )  + 5.  D  + e.  (14)  it  sst  i  mt  got  i,all  all  it 
asat-testonS.  ,whereD  —D  +D  +D  +D 
i,all  all  55  67  59  71 
Two  different  estimation  procedures  are  used  to  evaluate the estimates 
provided by  variants of  Equations (13) and (14) and  to  compare the estimates of 
the abnormal firm returns with  the changes predicted by  the traditional 
hypothesis and the A-K-F hypothesis.  The first set of  procedures assumes 
independence  across residual returns in  Equation (13)  and the second set of 
procedures allows for these residuals to  be  contemporaneously cross-correlated. 
These procedures are explained in turn. 
5.1.  OLS and WLS Regression Procedures 
Ito these procedures, Equation (13) and  (14)  are first estimated separately 
for each of  n firms over a common time period.  In  the second step, the n 
14  An  important assumption in  Equations (13)  and (14) is that the tax 
changes  are unanticipated.  If  these changes were anticipated, little or no 
reaction might be expected in  these months.  Auerbach and Hines  (1986) discuss 
how firm investment behavior may  differ when  tax changes are anticipated. 
15  The response to each tax change may differ because some of  the tax 
changes were explicitly temporary.  The ambiguous theoretical effect of ITCs on 
firm value even allows for the possibility  that a temporary ITC could increase 
firm  value, while a permanent ITC decreases firm value.  For example, an 
immediate one-day ITC may  be  unable to  affect investment,  but give firms that 
invest on  that day a windfall.  Further, unless the adjustment cost function is 
symmetric, the repeal of an  ITC may be  expected to affect firm value differently 
from  the reinstatement of  an  ITC. -14- 
estimated S  coefficients for a single tax change are used in a cross-eectional 
regression on  one of  the three variables DEPTA, CAPTA, or NPTA. 
The traditional hypothesis preditts that the percentage change in the value 
of  the firm will  be  positively related to  the firm's receipt of  ITCs relative to 
the total value of  the firm.  Using depreciation ma a proxy for expected firm 
investment, a test of the traditional hypotheaia ia conducted by  the 
cross-sectional regression 
S — a  +  b(DEFTA) + j,  (15) 
where S'—[S  50J is the vector of estimated Sj coeffitienta for a single tax 
change from  Equation (13)  (for example, the vector of i.  coefficients across 
all fins) or  from Equation (14)  (Si ally and DEPTA'  EDEPTAi  DEPTAn is a 
vector of  the DEPTA for each  firm,  with  DEFTA defined ma in  Equation (11). 
Estimates are presented separately for each of  the four tax changes and for an 
estimate based on  S  — £  -  A  similar  croaa-aectional  regression  is  also 
i  i,all 
estimated  with  CAPTA replacing DEPTA.  Using either DEPTA or  CAPTA, the 
traditional hypothesis predicts the sign  of  b is positive for each  of the four 
tax changes. 
The A-K-F hypothesis predicts that the change in the value of  the firm will 
be  the same as the expected change in the value of  the firm's existing assets.  A 
teat of  the A-K-F hypothesis  is conducted by the cross-sectional regression 
£ — a  +  b(NPTA) +  p,  (16) 
where NPTA'[NPTAi,...,NPTAn)  and NPTA  is defined in  Equation (12).  The A-K-F 
hypothesis predicts the sign  of b is negative for each of the four tax changes. 
The variables DEPTA, CAPTA, and  NPTA are likely to be  highly  correlated 
since firma that are equipment-intensive, as measured by  NPTA, also are likely to 
have large measures of  depreciation and  undertake a large amount of  replacement -15- 
investment.  If both  the traditional and A-K-F hypotheses are partially correct, 
the estimated coefficient b in  Equations (15)  and (16)  will reflect, in part, the 
effect of  the opposing hypothesis.  Provided CAPTA and NPTA are not highly 
collinear, the two hypotheses may be  tested simultaneously through the 
cross-sectional regression 
& —  a+ b (CAPTA) + b  (NPTA) + /4,  (17) 
A  finding of bL>O and  b2<O  would suggest elements of both  hypotheses are true. 
The parameter estimates in Equations (l5)-(l7) are unbiased, but 
inefficient, if the residuals  across firms do  not  have  a common variance.  It 
is possible that firms with  larger variances of  the residual returns i  in 
Equations (13)  and (14) also will  have  larger variances of  the residuals ij in 
Equations  (l5)-(l7).  Because the variance of  an  estimated Sj coefficient is 
proportional to 4 
—  E(4), the variance of the residuals  may  also  be 
proportional to 4.  The correction for this heteroacedasticity is to estimate 
Equations (15)-(17) using weighted least squares (WLS), where the weights are 
equal to the inverse of  the estimated standard deviation from  Equation (13) or 
(14).  Estimates of Equations (l5)-(17) are  conducted using both  OLS  and  WLS. 
B.2.  Seemingly Unrelated Resression Model Procedure 
A  possible disadvantage of the previous procedures is that if the residuals 
Eit in  Equation (13) or  (14) are contemporaneously correlated across firms, the 
estimated &j are  not independent across firms.  King (1966) found that security 
returns of  firms within  an  industry show evidence of  positive contemporaneous 
cross-correlation.  Because firms within an  industry also are likely to  have 
similar measures  of DEPTA,  CAPTA,  and  NPTA, it is more  likely that these  measures 
will be  found to be  significantly associated with the estimated 5  coefficients 
under the assumption of independence. -16- 
To account explicitly for possible cross-correlation, it  is necessary cc 
estimate Equation <13)  or (14)  simultaneously across firms using Zeilner's (1962) 
seemingly unrelated regression model (SUP.M),  The SURM, however, requires that 
the number of  time periods used  to  estimate the system be greater than the number 
of equations.  Given the large number of  firms used  in this study, it is not 
possible to estimate the system at  the firm level.  As  a solution to  this 
problem, the firms are grouped into a number of portfolios. 
The portfolios are formed by sorting the firms into groups based on  their 
relative values of  DEPTA, CAPTA, and NPTA.  For exsssple,  to  test the traditional 
hypothesis using the variable DEPTA, each firm is placed into one of  ten 
portfolios based on  the firm's decile rank of  the variable DEPTA.'6  Equation 
(13)  is modified to 
R.  -R  —$.(R  -R  )+  (D  xX)+ (D  xx.)  it  9st  2.  mt  sot  66  66  i  67  67  2. 
+ #(Dx  X.) + $(Dx  Xi) 
+ 
€itt  (18) 
and Equation (14)  is similarly modified to 
Rt_R95t_ i mtsot 
+ allsll  x X.) + €i  (19) 
where the variable X  is  equal to  mean value of  DEPTA, CAPTA, or  NPTA  for the 
portfolio, depending on  the hypothesis tested, and the coefficient  for a given 
year is restricted to  be equal across equations. 
For example, using Equation (18),  67 69  and  are each reatticted 
to be  equsl across firms, although #6 need not equal #67  Ot .  Equation 
(19) is similar to  estimating Equation (18) with  the further restriction that 
#66#67#66#71  Without the restrictions on  the # coefficient  for a given yeat, 
say ,  the value of  (D  x  X.) in  Equation (18)  for any portfolio is equal 
16  The  choice of  the number of  portfolios is arbitrary, provided it is  less 
than the number of time periods. -17- 
to  S.  in  Equation (13).  The traditional hypothesis predicts that the value of 
5  in  Equation (13) increases with the value of  DEPTA.  If 6.  increases 
i,66  L,5 
linearly with  DEPTA, this is equivalent to a constant  across portfolios in 
Equation (18),  when  X is replaced by  DEPTA.  The traditional hypothesis predicts 
all  coefficients in  Equation (18)  and (19)  are positive when  X is  replaced by 
DEPTA or  CAPTA. 
Similarly, the A-K-F hypothesis predicts that the value of  the S 
coefficients in  Equation (13) is negatively related to  NPTA.  The A-K-F 
hypothesis is tested against the prediction that all ' coefficients  are less than 
zero when  K is replaced by  NPTA. 
III.  Ernoirical  Analysis 
This section presents the empirical findings of  the effects of  the changes 
made to the ITC between 1966 and 1971 on firm  valuation.  The data are described 
in  the first part of  this section and the espirical results follow. 
A.  Data 
The firms used  in  this study are drawn from 914 U.S. firms listed on the New 
York  Stock Exchange prior to October 1965 that  have complete returns for the 
70-month period from April 1966 through January 1972.  The 70-month period begins 
five months before the first presidential request to  suspend the ITC and 
concludes five months after the final request to reinstate the ITC,  The stock 
returns and market  indices are obtained from the monthly stock returns tape of 
the Center for Research in Security Prices. Firm-specific information for 711 of  these firms is available from the 1970 
COMPUSTAT tape of  industrial firms.'7  All COMPUSTAT data are selected from the 
1968 fiscal year.18 
El.  OhS and WLS Regression Estimates 
The first empirical results presented assume independence of residual 
returns across firms.  Estimates of  &  ,  5.  ,  5.  ,  S.  and  5.  ore 
i,56  1,67  1,69  1,71'  tall 
obtained  for each  of the 711 firms by  estimating Equations (13)  and (14) 
separately for each firm.  The set of  estimated 5  parameters of all firms for 
any one year is then used  as the dependent variable in  cross-sectional 
regressions on  DEPTA, CAPTA, and EPTA. 
The traditional hypothesis is first tested by  OhS estimates of  Equation (15) 
with  the alternative dependent variables S.  ,  S .,S.,S.,ands..  tall  1,66  1,57  1,69  1,71 
The coefficient of  DEPTA is predicted by  the traditional  hypothesis  to be 
positive for each  of  the tax changes.  The estimates are presented in  the first 
row of Table 2. 
Using  the dependent variable 5i all' the coefficient of  DEPTA is found to be 
positive and highly  significant at  less than the 0.0001 probability level.  Using 
the estimated Si  for each of  the four tax changes separately, the coefficient of 
17  Of  the firms for which data  are not available on  the COMPUSTAT tape, 110 
of  these firms are electric and gss utilities; 49 firms are mutual funds, holding 
companies, or other financial institutions; 19 firma are from the transportation 
services sector; and the remaining 25 firms are distributed among all other 
industries. 
The fiscal year  1968 was chosen as  the approximate midpoint of the four 
tax changes.  Some  tests were conducted with  data  from different years and with 
the average of  1966-1969 information.  Results were  similar, although fewer firma 
had data for all years.  A  match of  the 914 firms using a more recent COMPUSTAT 
tape resulted in  significantly fewer firms.  Use of a single year's data  may 
reduce the likelihood of observing a relationship between firm  characteristics 
and changes in firm value if these firm characteristics varied over the 1966-1971 
period. -19- 
DEPTA is positive and significant for three of  the four tax changes. The one 
exception is the 1969 repeal of the ITC.  The coefficient of DEPTA is regative 
but insignificant, for this tax change.  WLS estimates of  Equation (15)  are 
presented in  the first row of Table 3.  The coefficient of DEPTA changes 
slightly, but remains very  significant for the dependent variables .  an.'  6i 
5.  ,  and 6 
1,67  1,71 
Tests of  the traditional hypothesis using the alternative variable CAPTA in 
Equation (15)  are presented in  the second row of  Table 2.  With the dependent 
variable 8. all' 
the  coefficient of  CAPTA is positive and highly significant  An 
examination of  the four  tax changes separately, however, shows that the 
coefficient of  CA,PTA is significant only  for the two reinstatements of  the ITT in 
1967 and 1969.  The WLS estimates, shown in  the second row of  Table 3,  are 
similar.  The coefficient of  CAPTA is positive and significant using the 
dependent variables &  ,  5.  ,  and  8  -  i,all  1,67 
Recall that a possible upper-bound estimate of  the percentage change in the 
value of the firm predicted by  the traditional hypothesis is given by  Equation 
(10)  (reproduced here) 
j-lj1iji'  (10) 
The variables DEPTA and CAPTA are each proxies for the first term in brackets. 
The coefficient of  DEPTA or  CAPTA in Equation (14)  could be as  large as  l/(r-g) 
if it were believed that the ITT is permanent, there were no  decline in  the value 
of  existing capital, and new investment permanently earns an excess return. 
If we  assume a real after-tax discount rate of  4 percent and a real growth 
rate of 3 percent, the coefficient of  DEPTA or  CAPTA could be  as large as 100. 
With  the same above conditions, except under the assumption that excess  returns 
attributable to the ITC persist for only the first 5 years from implementation of -20- 
the credit (and maintaining the assumption of no  decline in  the value of  existing 
capital), the coefficient of  DEPTA or  CAPTA would decline to  2.2.19 
The actual estimates of  the coefficients of  DEPTA and CAPTA (between 3.0 and 
7.1 from the WLS estimate) suggest a fairly lengthy period during which new 
investment earns an  excess return.  The magnitude of  the estimated coefficients 
are sensitive to the construction of  DEPTA and CAPTA.  If these variables 
understate the ITCa received by  the firm then the estimated coefficients will 
overstate the period  of  adjustment. 
Next, the A-K-F hypothesis is tested by conducting cross-sectional 
regressions on  Equation (16),  with  NPTA  as  the independent variable.  If assets 
decline in  value hy  the full amount predicted by  the A-K-F hypothesis, the value 
of  the coefficient of  NPTA would be -1.  The OLS estimates are presented in the 
third row  of  Table 2.  The actual estimates of  the coefficient are all positive, 
and they are significantly positive using 8i,all' 6i67' and  The OLS 
estimates are ahown in the third row of Table 3.  The estimates are similar, 
except the coefficient of  NPTA  for the 1969 repeal of  the ITC is negative.  The 
negative coefficient is not significant, however, at  standard significance 
levels.  These estimates do  not support the A-K-F hypothesis. 
A correlation matrix of  the independent variables DEPTA, CAPTA, and NPTA is 
presented in Table 4.  The variables are highly correlated.  As  discussed in 
Section II, if  the traditional hypothesis and the A-K-F hypothesis are both 
partially true,  the estimated coefficient of  DEPTA, CAPTA, and NPTA may reflect 
only the net effect of  the two hypotheses on  firm value.  A  regression that 
includes both CAPTA and NPTA as explanatory variables may find the predicted 
19  This is calculated as the present value of  after-tax rental savings 
assuming an  annual depreciation rate  of .15. -21- 
positive coefficient for CAPTA and a negative coefficient for NPTA.  Equation 
(17)  tests this hypothesis. 
OLS estimates of  Equation (17)  are shown in  Table 5.  These estimates do not 
find evidence of  a decline in  the value of the firm to  be  related to NPTA.  The 
coefficient of NPTA  is negative for only one of  the tax changes, and it is not 
significant for this tax change.  WLS estimates shown in  Table 6,  are similar. 
The failure to find support for the simultaneous operation of both hypotheses 
must  be tempered by the fact that the high  degree of  collinearity between CAPTA 
and NPTA  makes it difficult to  measure the separate effects of each of the 
variables, 
.2.  Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model Estimates 
The support for the traditional hypothesis using the OLS and WLS estimates 
is based on  the assumption that the residual returns across firms are 
uncorrelated.  If these residuals are contemporaneously cross-correlated, the 
statistical significance of  the relationship between the estimated 5 
coefficients  and DEPTA and  CAPTA may  be  overstated.  The SURM procedure provides 
a more  general test of the traditional and A-K-F hypotheses by  controlling for 
the pattern of  contemporaneous cross-correlation between groups of  firms. 
Ten portfolios are formed based on the decile ranking of a  firm  for each  of 
the variables DEPTA, CAPTA, and NPTA.  Equation (18)  or (19) is estimated 
simultaneously for a group of ten portfolios, where the variable X is replaced by 
the mean  value of  DEPTA, CAPTA, or NPTA  for each portfolio.  The restriction that 
, , ,  or al1  are equal across portfolios cannot be  rejected for 
the three sets of  portfolios. 
Tests of  the traditional hypothesis are examined first.  Estimates of 
Equations  (18)  and  (19)  using the ten portfolios based on  DEPTA are presented in -22- 
Table 7.  The estimated parameter mall is positive and significant.  The value of 
the coefficient  is very close to  the estimated coefficient of  DEFTA in  Equstion 
(15)  using WLS, shown in  Table 3.  The significance of  the coefficient is reduced 
slightly from the WLS estimate.  The estimated  coefficients for each  of  the 
four tax changes are positive.  The values of  these coefficients are also similar 
to the WLS estimates in  Table 3.  Of  these four coefficients, however, only the 
coefficient for the 1971 reinstatement of  the ITC is now significant. 
Estimates based on  the ten portfolios formed using CAPTA are shown in the 
second column of  Table 7.  The coefficient ll  is positive and significant.  The 
value of  the coefficient is also very  close to the WLS estimate of  Equation  (15) 
shown in  Table 3.  The coefficients for the 1967 and 1971 reinstatement of  the 
TTC are positive and  significant, although slightly less significant than  the WLS 
estimates of  Equation (15).  The estimated coefficients for the other two tax 
chsnges also  are positive, but not significant. 
Tests of  the A-K-F hypothesis using the portfolios formed on  NPTA  appear in 
the third column of  Table 7.  The A-K-F hypothesis predicts s  negstive vslue  for 
the # coefficients.  The sctusl estimate of  *all is positive and  significant. 
The vslue of  this psrsmeter is also similar to the WLS estimate of  the 
coefficient of  NPTA  in  Equstion (16).  Only  69 is estimsted to be  negative, and 
it is not significant.  Of  the three positive coefficients, the estimate of 
is found to be  significantly positive. 
B.3.  Discussion 
The empiricsl results of  this section generally support the traditional 
hypothesis.  The OLS and WLS estimates show the change in firm value  from the 
four tsx changes in  aggregate 8i  sll is positively related to the expected 
receipt of  ITCs by  the firm (DEPTA or  CAPTA).  Tests of  the traditional -23- 
hypothesis applying the SURM also find a highly significant positive relation 
between the change in firm value from the four tax changes in  aggregate and 
measures incorporating the expected receipt of  ITCs (all)  The estimates of 
each of  the tax changes separately are not as significant, although the estimated 
values of the coefficients imply a fairly lengthy period during which new 
investment earns an  excess return.  Firms in  the quartile with the largest 
measure of  DEPTA  increase in value by an  average of  1.8 percentage points more 
than firms in  the lowest quartile in the month of a presidential announcement to 
reinstate the ITC.20 
The estimates do not support the A-K-F hypothesis that the ITC causes a 
decline in  the value of  existing assets that results in a decline in firm value. 
The change in  firm value actually appears to be  positively related to  the ITC- 
weighted measure of the firm's assets  (NPTA) upon  introduction of an  ITC, 
although this relationship is less significant  than measures which incorporate 
the expected receipt of  ITCs.  These results suggest that the benefits a firm is 
expected to receive from future investment qualifying for the ITC outweigh any 
expected decline in  the value of  the firm's existing assets from increased future 
competition. 
The magnitude of  the estimates are consistent with a  model providing rental 
cost  savings (losses) to  the firm equal to  the full amount of  the ITC over  at 
least the first five years of  investment from reinstatement (repeal) of  the ITC. 
Excess returns on  new investment may  persist due to adjustment Costs.  Existing 
firms may be  better able to benefit from  an hG  due to their plans to replace 
depreciated capital.  These firms may also earn  economic rents on  any intangible 
20  The hypothesis of  equality can be rejected at less than the 5 percent 
probability level. 24- 
capital the firms possess that allow them to  increase investment at a faster rate 
than new entrants.  Further, the structure of  the ITC gives the largest 
investment incentive to those firms with  current profits.  Excess tax credits are 
not refundable and,  if no recent past  tax liability exists, they must  be  carried 
forward for use in  a future year, reducing the present value of  the benefit. 
This provision would make it difficult for a start-up firm to receive the same 
effective ITC per dollar of  investment that currently profitable firms receive. 
Profitable firms in industries with a low use of  equipment may  be  encouraged to 
expand into equipment-intensive industries, but entry into new lines of  business 
might be  expected to occur only slowly. 
IV.  Summary 
This paper investigates the effect of  changes in investment incentives on 
the value of  the firm.  The wealth  effects caused by  changes in ITCa and 
accelerated depreciation are ambiguous, except under special conditions.  If  the 
economy is composed of  perfectly competitive firms and there are no  adjustment 
coats, the A-K-F hypothesis is shown to  be  theoretically correct.  Alternatively, 
with infinite costs of  adjustment to positive net investment, the traditional 
hypothesis is shown to  be correct.  In  between these extremes, we  know neither 
the magnitude nor the direction of  these net effects. 
The empirical findings of  this paper suggest that the ITC causes a 
redistribution of wealth that benefits investors of  new  equipment.  Firas that 
own  existing equipment generally benefit, perhapa because they are in a  better 
position to undertake new investment in  equipment.  Policies designed to offset 
directly this benefit to existing owners of  capital, auth as by  implementing a 
direct wealth tax on  existing capital in  conjunction with  an ITC,  may themselves 
be  viewed to  violate equity considerations.  Distributional analysis which -25- 
neglects the wealth transfers caused by the implementation of an ITG,  however, 
may overstate the progressivity of the tax system with  respect to existing 
wealth. The Tax Reform Act of  1986 repealed the investment tax credit (ITO) ,  rarking 
the third time the ITO has either been suspended or  repealed since its 
introduction in  1962.  The ITO was originally designed to encourage new 
investment by  reducing the after-tax cost of  new investment at a smaller cost to 
the government than from a statutory tax rate reduction.  An ITO only reduces the 
tax burden of new investment,  while a statutory rate reduction also reduces tax 
revenues from existing investment.  To  prevent existing assets from being resold 
to qualify for the ITO,  the amount of  used investment eligible for the ITO always 
was strictly limited. 
The selective lowering of the effective tax rate faced by  new investment 
through the ITO is traditionally thought to increase the after-tax return from 
new investment, without altering the profitability of  existing assets.  Under 
this assumption, the value of  the firm  must increase following the introduction 
of an  ITO.  Abel (1982) presents a  partial equilibrium model that supports this 
view, which will  be  referred to  as the "traditional hypothesis." 
The traditional hypothesis has been challenged by  Auerbsch and Kotlikoff 
(1983) and Feldstein (1981).  The Auerbach-Kotlikoff-Feldstein (A-K-F) hypothesis 
maintains that the value of  a firm must decline following the introduction of an 
ITO.  They  argue that if competition eliminates any  excess return to new 
investment, then the value of  existing sssets must decline by the amount of  the 
ITO in  order to  compete in  the output market with the subsidized new investment. 
Following this view, Downs and  Hendershott  (1987)  derive the theoretical 
increases in  the value of  firms from the 1986 Tax Reform Act. 
Summers (1981, 1983), Cravelle  (1984),  and, more recently, Auerbsch (1986) 
note  the ambiguous effects of  an  ITC on  firm value.  The long-run equilibrium 
value of  existing capital is expected to decline by  the amount of  the ITO.  Until 
the long-run equilibrium is reached, however, new investment may earn an  excess REFERENCES 
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Investment Tax Credit Rates by Asset 
Asset  ITC 
Furniture and fixtures  .07 
Fabricated metal products  .07 
Engines and turbines  .07 
Tractors  .0233 
Agricultural machinery  .07 
Construction machinery  .07 
Mining and oil field machinery  .07 
Metalworking machinery  .07 
Special industry machinery  .07 
General industry equipment  .07 
Office and computing machinery  .07 
Service industry machinery  .07 
Electrical machinery  .07 
Trucks, buses and trailers  .0467 
Autos  .0233 
Aircraft  .0467 
Ships and  boats  .07 
Railroad equipment  .07 
Instruments  .07 
Other equipment  .07 
Railroads  .07 
Telephone and telegraph  .03 
Electric light and  power  .03 
Gas  .03 
Other public utilities  .03 
Source:  Author's calculations.  See text for assumptions. Table 2 
Relationship Between Abnormal  Security Return 8 and the 
Expected Change in Firm Value: Ordinary  Least Squares 
Equation  8.  8.  8.  8.  8. 
i.all  1.66  1.67  1.69  1.71 
(15)  DEPTA  9.585  7.418  8.842  -0.516  22.923 
(5.16)  (2.26)  (2.37)  (0.15)  (6.23) 
R2  .036  .007  .008  .000  .052 
(15)  CAPTA  3.087  -0.142  4.328  -0.291  8.600 
(4.12)  (0.11)  (2.88)  (0.21)  (5.93) 
It2  .024  .000  .012  .000  .049 
(16)  NPTA  0.907  0.427  0.918  0.056  2.260 
(4.40)  (1.17)  (2.23)  (0.15)  (5.53) 
It2  .027  .002  .007  .000  .041 
t-statistics in parentheses Table 3 
Relationship Between Abnormal Security  Return 6 and the 
Expected Change in Firm Value: Weighted Least Squares 
Equation  6.  5.  6.  6.  5. 
i.all  1.55  i.67  1.59  ,71 
(15)  DEPTA  7.084  8.497  6.716  -2.501  16.745 
(4.14)  (2.79)  (2.01)  (0.80)  (5.01) 
(15)  CAPTA  2.962  0.877  4.909  -1.177  7580 
(3.52)  (0.59)  (3.02)  (0.78)  (4.69) 
(16)  NPTA  0.618  0.589  1.000  -0.487  1.468 
(3.08)  (1.65)  (2.58)  (1.34)  (3,74) 
t-statistics in parentheses Table 4 
Correlation Matrix of Explanatory Variables 
DEPTA  CAPTA  NPTA 
DEPTA  1.00 
CAPTA  0.56  1.00 
NPTA  0.72  0.68  1.00 
Mean  0.00132  0.00218  0.01099 
Std.  Dev.  0.00081  0.00206  0.00734 
Observations  710  685  711 Table 5 
Relationship Between Abnormal Security Return 6 and the 
Expected Change in Firm Value: Ordinary Least 
Squares Estimates of Equation (17) 
CAPTA  NPTA 
1.847  0.517  .029 
(1.80)  (1.78) 
-2.481  0.976  .005 
(1.38)  (1.91) 
3.753  0.240  .012 
(1.83)  (0.41) 
5.  0.150  -0.184  .000 
1,69 
(0.08)  (0.34) 
6.079  1.052  .054 
(3.07)  (1.87) 
t-statistics in parentheses Table 6 
Relationship Between Abnormal Security Return 8 and  the 
Expected Change in Firm Value: Weighted Least 
Squares Estimates of Equation (17) 
CAPTA 
6.  2.483  0.172  i,all 
(2.16)  (0.61) 
8.  -1.787  0.962 
1,66 
(0,88)  (1.91) 
8.  4.196  0.257  1,67 
(1.89)  (0.47) 
8.  0.129  -0.833  1,69 
(0.55)  (1.63) 
6.  6.532  0.378  1,71 
(2.95)  (0.69) 
t-statistics in parentheses Table 7 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Method Tests: 
Parameter Estimates of the Relationship Between Abnormal Security 
Returns and the Expected Change in Firm Value 
DEPTA  CAPTA  NPTA 
(1)  6.909  3.038  0.560 
all 
(2.79)  (3.35)  (2.01) 
(2)  6.094  1.711  0.731 
(1.23)  (0.94)  (1.32) 
(3)  5.044  4.697  0.204 
67  (1.01)  (2.57)  (0.37) 
(4)  3.490  1.960  -  .182 
69  (0.70)  (1.08)  (0.33) 
(5)  13.318  4.050  1.393 
(2.67)  (2.21)  (2.51) 
t-statistics in parentheses 